LIBRARY
OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY

(nos. 967-970 not used)

WORKING PAPER
ALFRED P. SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

Municipal Labor Relations in San Francisco*

Harry C. Katz

WP971-78 February 1978

MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
50 MEMORIAL DRIVE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139

Municipal Labor Relations in San Francisco*

Harry C. Katz

WP971-78 February 1978

*The author is Assistant Professor of Economics and Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The author is grateful to Lloyd Ulman, Mike Wiseman, Clair Vickery, Joseph Garbarino and Kathy Swartz for helpful suggestions.

Financial support for this research was provided by the Department of Labor under grant 91-06-77-02. The author is, however, solely responsible for the contents of this paper.

This is a preliminary draft. Please do not quote. (Comments are welcome.)

What is the impact of municipal employees and their unions on employee pay and how do these bodies go about influencing pay determination? The existing literature presents incomplete and contradictory answers to those questions. Regarding the size of the impact of municipal employee unions, on the one side stands extensive cross-sectional econometric evidence which argues that these unions have little, if any, impact on employee wages.[1] On the other side of this debate stands argumentation and an extensive folklore which asserts that public employees and their unions, through strikes and other tactics, exercise excessive power.[2]

The ability of the econometric studies to measure the impact of unions on pay determination can be criticized on a number of grounds. Relying on cross-sectional data, the econometric analyses ignore dynamic effects. In part this weakness is summarized in the criticism that the "threat effect" of unions cannot be measured in these studies. In addition, the econometric analyses provide scant evidence concerning how unions exert their influence. The measure of union influence used in these studies is the percent of workers organized. Whether or how percent organized provides an accurate measure of union power is a question that is left unanswered by these studies.

The union power thesis also suffers from a lack of discussion regarding how it is that unions go about influencing decision making in the public sector. It has been argued that the potency of the strike weapon and the essential nature of public services allow public sector unions to disrupt the "normal political process." However, empirical evidence substantiating the claims of the union power thesis is absent from the debate. Although anecdotal references are sometimes available, there have been few attempts

to historically analyze the process of labor relations in particular municipalities.[3]

This paper summarizes the results of a case study of the impact of municipal employees and their unions in the city of San Francisco over the post-World War II period.[4] The case study attempts to determine how employee compensation changed over the period; the influence that changes in pay setting procedures exerted on employee pay; and the channels through which municipal employees and their representatives affected employee pay. As part of the latter issue analysis is made of the role that strikes and multilateral bargaining played in labor relations.

Employee Compensation

The municipal workforce in San Francisco has four distinct groups -- craft workers, police and firefighters, transit drivers and miscellaneous employees -- each of whose wages have historically been determined in a separate manner.[5] The base wages and the city's pension contribution for each of these four groups for a sample of years from 1945 through 1976 are reported in Table 1. The compensation of roughly half of the city's craft workers were tied to that of general laborers so the latter job title was chosen as an example of craft pay. Miscellaneous employees comprise all of the workforce not in the other categories (roughly two-thirds of total city employees). The table illustrates the pay received by the particular job titles of clerk typist and assistant engineer but these figures provide a good measure of the pay increases received by other miscellaneo employee

As revealed in Table 1, the rate of increase in the wages of what may be called "select group" workers (craft, police and firefighters, and transit drivers) was from two to two and a half times that received by

TABLE 1

Wage and Pension Costs for a Sample of City Employees 1945-1976*

			(Craft)	(Miscellaneous Employees)	
	Transit Drivers	Police	General Laborer	Clerk Typist	Assistant Engineer
1945					
Base Salary	2,028	2,700	1,920	2,400	4,500
Pension Costs	229	472	217	271	509
Total Labor Costs	2,257	3,172	2,137	2,671	5,009
In 1967 $	4,366	6,135	4,133	5,166	9,689
1950					
Base Salary	3,132	3,780	3,120	3,000	5,640
Pension Costs	384	1,015	383	368	691
Total Labor Costs	3,516	4,795	3,503	3,368	6,331
In 1967 $	5,201	7,093	5,182	4,982	9,365
1955					
Base Salary	4,032	5,280	4,380	3,960	6,900
Pension Costs	506	1,506	550	497	866
Total Labor Costs	4,538	6,786	4,930	4,457	7,766
In 1967 $	5,924	8,859	6,436	5,819	10,138
1960					
Base Salary	5,412	7,152	6,144	4,980	8,520
Pension Costs	563	1,596	640	518	887
Total Labor Costs	5,975	8,748	6,784	5,498	9,407
In 1967 $	6,805	9,964	7,727	6,262	10,714
1965					
Base Salary	6,696	8,820	8,112	5,736	11,292
Pension Costs	346	1,393	419	296	583
Total Labor Costs	7,042	10,213	8,531	6,032	11,875
In 1967 $	7,436	10,785	9,008	6,370	12,540
1970					
Base Salary	10,974**	12,240	11,208	7,692	14,400
Pension Costs	1,044	4,945	1,255	862	1,613
Total Labor Costs	12,018	17,185	12,463	8,554	16,013
In 1967 $	10,771	15,402	11,170	7,666	14,351

Table 1, Continued

	Transit Drivers	Police	(Craft) General Laborer	(Miscellaneous Employees) Clerk Typist	Assistant Engineer
1975					
Base Salary	16,473	18,180	17,304	9,612	18,300
Pension Costs	2,344	10,472	2,810	1,561	2,972
Total Labor Costs	18,817	28,652	20,114	11,173	21,272
In 1967 $	11,724	17,852	12,532	6,961	13,254
1976					
Base Salary	16,751	18,816	15,720	9,900	19,284
Pension Costs	2,859	13,585	2,897	1,824	3,553
Total Labor Costs	19,610	32,401	18,617	11,724	22,837
In 1967 $	11,529	19,048	10,945	6,892	13,426

*The reported base salary for police, clerk typists and assistant engineers is the maximum amount earned after three years of employment. Pension costs are calculated by multiplying the city's per payroll dollar pension times the base salary. San Francisco's retirement system is funded on an actuarial basis and these pension costs provide a good approximation to the present value of the pension benefits. Pension costs (although not benefits) fell from 1960 to 1965 because of the existence of retirement fund surpluses during that period. For details about the pension system, see H. Katz op. cit., Chapter 5. Salary figures are derived from the annual Salary Standardization Ordinance, City and County of San Francisco, various years. The per payroll dollar pension contribution figures are taken from the "Employees' Retirement System -- Annual Report 1976-77," City and County of San Francisco. Constant dollar figures were derived using a C.P.I. deflator der from the "C.P.I. For Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers," San Francisco-Oakland SMSA, 1947 - , BLS, All Items - Series A.

**From 1968, the transit driver's pay package included a trust fund contribution and as of 1975 also included cost of living increases. These benefits are included in the calculation of base salary.

miscellaneous employees. The wage increases received by miscellaneous employees in the early 1970's were particularly modest given the high rates of inflation experienced at that time. From 1970 to 1975, the real compensation (wages plus pension) received by the clerk typists and assistant engineers fell, respectively, by 9.2 and 7.6 percent. This decrease in real compensation was typical of almost all miscellaneous employees and stands in sharp contrast to the real pay increases received by select group employees during the same period. For example, the total real compensation received by police and general laborers increased, respectively, 15.9 and 12.2 percent over that same five year period.

By 1970, police and firefighters had become the highest paid city workers largely because of their pension benefits. Expansion of those benefits continued and even accelerated in the early 1970's. Pension cost for police and firefighters rose from 27 and 25 cents, respectively, per payroll dollar in 1970 to 74 and 67 cents in 1976. The wage figure for police reported in Table 1 measures the basic compensation received by patrolmen after 3 years of service. Overtime, night holiday, and other pay differentials are earned on top of that base salary. On any terms, the total compensation received by police of $32,400 in 1976 stands out as a strikingly large figure.[7]

Pay Setting Procedures

What procedures were used to set the pay increases reported in Table 1? This section discusses the various procedures that have been used to set municipal employee pay in San Francisco. In particular, attention is focused on the role that employees and their representatives played in changing and implementing those procedures.

All of the select group workers historically have had their wages set by charter pay formulas. From 1945 through 1976, city craft workers benefited from a pay formula which set their hourly wages equal to the wages paid union craft workers in the private sector in San Francisco.[8] Police and firefighters had their wages set by a pay formula which from 1952 through 1976 provided that the Board of Supervisors (San Francisco equivalent of a city council) set their wages so as not to exceed the wages paid municipal public safety forces in California in any city with a population greater than 100,000. The Board annually chose to match the highest paying city which in recent years has been Los Angeles.[9] A similar charter formula empowered the Board to set transit drivers pay so as not to exceed initially the highest paying city in California (in effect from 1945 to 1956) and then the average of the highest paying cities in the United States.[10] As was the case for police and firefighters, the Board annually chose to pay transit drivers the highest wage allowed by this formula. Miscellaneous employees have not benefited from a pay formula, but rather, since 1932 have had their wages set in a prevailing rate procedure which involves an annual wage survey and recommendations by the city's Civil Service Commission and final determination by the Board of Supervisors.

Formalized bargaining between the city and employee representatives has largely been absent from San Francisco. This has, however, not deprived city employees of a say in pay determination. Employees and their representatives influenced pay determination through their active political involvement in the passage and implementation of the ballot measures that imposed the charter pay formulas. Municipal employee groups (both unions and associations) with the support of private sector unions were a significant force in the election campaigns that surrounded pay formula amendments to the city's

charter. For police, firefighters, and transit drivers political lobbying was also necessary to insure favorable implementation of existing pay formulas by the Board of Supervisors. Their pay formulas only set a maximum allowable wage. Until 1975, the Board always chose to pay the highest wages allowed in each of these formulas, a tradition which in large part must be attributed to the lobbying efforts of employees and their representatives.

It is ironic to note that the imposition of pay formulas was viewed by many as a way to constrain the potentially excessive political influence that employees might exercise if more discretion was placed in the hands of the Board.[11] In point of fact, the pay formulas appear to have enhanced the power of select group employees by allowing them to ride the coattails of other more powerful groups. The crafts pay formula explicitly tied city craft pay to the wages bargained by powerful private sector craft unions in San Francisco. City transit drivers benefited similarly by having their compensation linked to the pay provided drivers in central cities where transit is much more of an essential service than it is in San Francisco.

The fact that the Board of Supervisors continually interpreted the pay formulas in the favor of select group employees could be attributed solely to the strength of the employee lobby, however, two other factors should be mentioned. The Board appears to be extremely desirous of avoiding the hard task of setting employee wages. The avoidance of situations that create political turmoil -- what may be called confrontation avoidance -- seems to have been of primary concern to the Board. Regularly fixing wages at the maximum allowed in charter formulas enabled the Board to avoid conflict ridden situations. In addition, once the Board had adopted the pattern of

setting wages in that fashion, employees came to expect that sort of interpretation. Deviations from that rule served as a rallying cry for city employees and created just the sort of political turmoil the Board was eargerly trying to avoid.

The political leverage of city employees was also exercised in the ballot campaigns that surrounded changes in the city's pension systems. Formidable opposition to employee interests in those campaigns was provided by downtown business groups who were led by the city's Chamber of Commerce. In fact, there is no instance when a significant pension-improvement ordinance passed over the vocal opposition of the Chamber. Major pension improvements passed in the late 1960's and early 1970's only when the Chamber either went along with employee demands or was distracted from vocal opposition by concern over other issues.[12]

The formation of pension-related amendments often involved meetings between downtown business groups and representatives of both city employees and private sector unions with the mayor sometimes operating as a mediator in those meetings. The following is an example of this sort of bargaining. In the mid 1960's the Chamber of Commerce was in favor of a number of administrative reforms to the pension system including disability re-examination and the replacement of one of the employee members of the city's Retirement Board with a representative from the community. City employees, on the other hand, were anxious to upgrade the pension system in the face of their repeated failure (in the face of Chamber opposition) to pass improvement amendments in the preceeding years. In a compromise effected by then Mayor Alioto, the Chamber agreed to support pension upgrading in exchange for the inclusion of administrative reforms of the pension system in the charter amendments. In addition, city employees agreed not to oppose

a street improvement bond issue favored by the business community. The agreed upon pension-system amendments and the street improvement bond issue then passed easily in municipal elections.

The Frustration of Miscellaneous Employees

While select group employees reaped the benefits of favorable pay formulas, by way of prevailing rate pay procedures miscellaneous employees received moderate pay increases which in the 1970's became extremely modest increases. A few groups of miscellaneous employees fared much better. Lower pay level employees such as laundry, food service and clerical workers received large pay increases in the late 1960's by the good graces of the Civil Service Commission (who recommended those increases) and the Board of Supervisors (who approved them). Urban unrest and civil rights protests had become heated political issues in the mid 1960's. In this atmosphere the fact that lower pay level miscellaneous jobs were heavily occupied by members of San Francisco's minority populations became a political issue to city officials. Large pay increases for those low level jobs were seen as a vehicle by which the city could answer those political concerns and function as a model employer.

Some miscellaneous employees received large wage increases by way of their reclassification to craft pay status. Although according to the city charter craft status was determined as a function of the union status of the private sector counterparts to city employees, reclassification occassionally appears to have been manipulated for political purposes. The reclassification of streetsweepers seems to be an instance where a union which contained both public and private sector members was rewarded for the

support they had provided to the mayor's election campaign.[13]

On the whole, miscellaneous employees exerted little influence on the determination of their wages. Employees and their representatives did lobby periodically before both the Board of Supervisors and the Civil Service Commission, but their influence appears to have been minimal. Miscellaneous employees remain frustrated in their efforts to create a pay setting system which involves formalized bargaining between them and the city. In 1970 and 1974, miscellaneous employees participated in strikes which served to temporarily replace prevailing rate pay procedures with face to face bargaining between employee representatives and city officials including the mayor and members of the Board of Supervisors. However, the city withstood the strikes, which included participation of transit drivers, with relative ease. Strike settlement terms did not diverge from the pattern of modest wage increases received by miscellaneous employees in the late 60's and early 1970's.

Union efforts to organize miscellaneous employees have been trapped in a "Catch 22" dilemma.[14] With the absence of formalized bargaining these unions have little to offer prospective members. And without a more belligerent organized membership, miscellaneous employee unions are hard pressed to induce the city to adopt formalized bargaining as a wage setting procedure.

Why the Absence of Formalized Bargaining?

The figures presented in Table 1 reveal the high compensation received by police, firefighter, craft and transit workers, and provide an explanation for the absence of formalized bargaining in San Francisco. Through charter formulas and effective political lobbying these select groups were

doing well without formalized bargaining. Miscellaneous employees, on the other hand, were eager to impose bargaining as a wage setting procedure but lacked the muscle to do so. Representatives of the miscellaneous employees express bitter resentment at the lack of support their efforts received from the ranks of the select group workers. This resentment came back to haunt city employees as the lack of ties between miscellaneous and select group employees contributed to the weakness with which city employees faced the public's backlash that began in the fall of 1975.

Another factor that perpetuated the absence of formalized bargaining was voter resistance toward the transfer of discretionary wage-setting authority to the Board of Supervisors. Voters repeatedly turned down ordinances that would have transferred more authority to the Board and thereby open the door to more formalized bargaining. The public was leary of the potential political influence of city employees and revealed that even in such a "pro-labor" town as San Francisco there persisted public mistrust of the process of collective bargaining.

Reliance on charter pay formulas was also supported by the fact that neither the Board of Supervisors nor the mayor's office was strongly in favor of a shift to collective bargaining. The shift to discretionary versus formula pay setting would have complicated the task of wage setting -- something the Board was eager to avoid. The reticence of the mayor's office was a product of the decentralized structure of San Francisco city government which spread power between a mayor, board of supervisors and chief administrative officer. Throughout the years, any power the mayor had gathered in the labor relations area was largely acquired through informal channels, usually by force of character.[15] The imposition of

formalized bargaining likely would have deprived the mayor's office of the influence it had gathered through these informal channels. Consequently, the absence of collective bargaining in the public sector in San Francisco can be explained by the fact that other than the powerless miscellaneous employees no one supported the shift to such bargaining, neither the voters, the Board of Supervisors, the mayor, nor other city employees.

The Backlash Against City Employees

In the fall of 1975, voters in San Francisco took a number of steps that signalled a reversal in the fortunes of city employees. In November 1975, ordinances were overwhelmingly passed which removed the crafts pay formula and mandated that crafts pay be set by the same prevailing rate procedure that set miscellaneous employee pay. In addition, the police and firefighter pay formula was tightened so as to produce lower wage increases.[16] Other ordinances were approved which limited city employee influence including immediate dismal for strike action and a provision dictating that any future disputes that might arise in prevailing pay procedures be decided by direct public vote. The following spring, faced with resulting pay cuts that averaged $2,000 and went as high as $4,500, city craft workers went on strike with the support of transit drivers and were soundly defeated. Voters continued their backlash against city employees by imposing less generous pension plans for all new hires and tightened the miscellaneous pay procedure by imposing a formula calculation of prevailing pay rates.

The Board of Supervisors marched in step with the new public mood and actively supported the pay revisions but the timidity of the Board was exemplified in the form those revisions took. The new procedures insured that more modest wage increases would be provided by tightening the charter wage formulas, however, it should be remembered that the Board always had the authority under the old pay formulas to grant lower wage increases to police, firefighters and miscellaneous employees. What the new procedures did was to remove all forms of discretion that had previously been allowed to the Board. The Board even lent its support to the new prevailing rate procedure for miscellaneous employees which essentially transfers final wage setting responsibility to the Civil Service Commission. Preoccupied by their desire to avoid responsibility for wage setting the Board was willing to go as far as to transfer authority to a commission which was potentially under the political influence of the mayor's office.

The severity of the backlash against city employees in San Francisco seems to have been the result of a combination of national and local events. The spring of 1975 had brought news of New York City's default crisis and triggered concern throughout the nation that extravagant public employee pay was in large part to blame for the fiscal plight of the country's central cities. Voters throughout the country responded by reversing many of the gains of public employees.[17] In the fall of 1975, the Board of Supervisors responded to the public's mood of fiscal conservation and moved to break the tradition of matching the wages provided in the highest paying city in California for police and firefighters. The city's public safety forces

responded by going out on strike, an unprecedented event for the city. The public rebelled in anger against the striking workers, anger inflamed by Mayor Alioto's declaration of a state of emergency and settlement of the strike on terms very close to those demanded by the striking workers. The strikers had won the battle but lost the war as voters then proceeded to revise the charter pay formula governing police and firefighters and pass other anti-employee measures mentioned earlier.

Concern over the city's high labor costs had also been fueled by a series of newspapers stories that outlined the benefits received by city craft workers. Attention was repeatedly focussed on the excess of a system that allowed streetsweepers to be paid an annual base salary of $17,000. Resentment toward the high craft pay scales had become so extensive as to contribute to the reluctance of both miscellaneous city employees and private sector craft workers to support the city craft worker's strike.[18]

Channels of Employee and Union Influence

The rapid reversal in the fortunes of police, firefighters, and craft workers in San Francisco reveals how heavily these workers rely on their political influence. When political winds turned against city employees, the strength of these employees quickly disappeared. If the strength of these employees was founded on the strike threat or the inelasticity of the demand for public services, as many argue, one would be hard pressed to explain the suddeness and the scope of the reversal of public employee fortunes.

It is clear that San Francisco city employees have never relied on the stri

get their way. It was not until the 1970's that any strikes occurred and when they did employees either lost those strikes or were held to a stand off.[19] Elsewhere, evidence is reported that shows that hiring and departmental budgets in San Francisco responded strongly to changes in the relative costs of labor.[20] This is further evidence of the fact that city employees did not rely on the esential nature of their services to strengthen their demands.

Craft, police, firefighter and transit workers did well in San Francisco by using their political muscle to first promote generous pay formulas, and when necessary, to effectively lobby so as to assure favorable interpretation of those formula. Miscellaneous employees, lacking political strength, were unsuccessful at improving upon their modest pay increases. The history of events in San Francisco suggests that students of municipal labor relations pay careful attention to the political strength of various employee groups and the rivalries or ties that exist between these groups. The rift between select group and miscellaneous employees played an important role in shaping municipal labor relations in San Francisco. The relationship between general city workers and city employees analogous to San Francisco's select group employees probably plays a significant role in shaping public sector labor relations in other cities as well.

The presence of multilateral bargaining -- bargaining where managerial authority is shared by a number of parties -- is often said to be a factor characteristic of bargaining in the public sector.[21] Our study of labor relations in San Francisco reveals two distinct forms of multilateralism. Management is split in that city in the sense that a number of city officials

including the mayor, the Board of Supervisors, and the Civil Service Commission are involved in determination of the city's position in its relationship with its employees. Responsibility for that position is shared, often grudgingly, by all of these parties. In addition, management is multilateral because of the participation of community representatives in public sector labor relations. In San Francisco, an example of that participation is the negotiations that occurred between downtown business groups and public and private sector employee representatives regarding pension — related ballot ordinances. City officials functioned at times as participants and in other instances as the mediator to those negotiations.

It could be argued that the heavy reliance on political influence by city employees and their representatives is peculiar to San Francisco. In cities where public sector labor relations involve more formalized collective bargaining, employee groups may derive their strength from other sources. San Francisco may, however, prove to be more than just an interesting exception. Even in cities that set wages through a system of collective bargaining what counts may still be the voter gathering and political lobbying capabilities of employee groups. That relationship may only be more obvious in San Francisco because of that city's tradition of using the ballot box to provide changes in employee compensation. Determining the uniqueness of San Francisco, however, may have to wait until historical analysis of municipal labor relations in other cities is available.

Footnotes

1. This literature is surveyed in D. Lewin, "Public Sector Labor Relations", Labor History, Winter 1977.

2. See H. Wellington and R. Winter, "The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment," Yale Law Journal, June 1969. For a reply to this article see J. Burton and C. Krider," The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees," Yale Law Journal, Jan. 1970.

3. Notable exceptions are R. Horton, Municipal Labor Relations in New York City -- Lessons of the Lindsay Wagner Years, (Praeger Pub., New York, 1972), and D. Lewin, "Local Government Labor Relations in Transition: The Case of Los Angeles," Labor History, Spring 1976.

4. See H. Katz, The Impact of Public Employee Unions on City Budgeting and Employee Remuneration -- A Case Study of San Francisco, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1977. It should be noted that San Francisco is incorporated as a city and county, however, throughout this paper references will be made to the "city" of San Francisco.

5. The respective 1976-77 employment of these four groups are: police and firefighters (3,692), craft workers (2,015), transit drivers (1,902) and miscellaneous employees (15,802). San Francisco has an independent school board which manages labor relations with its employees. To simplify the study, labor relations between school teachers and the school board have been ignored. Sanitation workers are excluded from consideration in this study because the city contracts with a private employer for refuse collection.

6. Annual pay increases for a much wider sample of city employees is provided in H. Katz, op. cit., Chapters 2 and 3.

7. The total compensation received by firefighters differs only slightly from that of police. Firefighters earned the same base salary but their pension costs were slightly lower.

8. The dollar equivalent of private contract fringe benefits was added to the calculation of crafts pay in an ordinance passed in 1962.

9. The Board broke that tradition in 1975 which precipitated events described later in this paper.

10. In 1968, an ordinance passed which allowed the Board to also match the fringe benefits received by drivers in these two highest paying cities. The terms of the wage and fringe benefit package received by transit drivers was annually negotiated by the Transport Workers Union and city officials.

11. This argument was repeated frequently in the campaigns that surrounded the passage of these formulas. San Francisco's rich and at times lurid political history provided warnings of the deleterious effects of corrupt city administration. See W. Bean, Boss Reaf's San Francisco, (University of California Press, San Francisco, 1952).

12. A chronology of the various pension-related ordinances is provided in H. Katz, op. cit., Chapter 5.

13. The reclassification was pushed through by the head of the city's Civil Service Commission who was a former bodyguard of then Mayor Alioto.

14. It was not until 1975 that elections were held to establish formal representatives for miscellaneous employees under the city's "Municipal Relations Ordinance" which had passed in 1973.

15. Joseph Alioto, mayor from 1968 through 1975, exemplified that tradition. With a forceful personality and many years experience as a mediator in both private and public labor disputes, Mayor Alioto became the major figure in municipal labor relations during his tenure.

16. The new formula mandated that police and firefighter wages be set equal to the average wages paid public safety workers in California's cities which have a population greater than 350,000.

17. For a description of some of the steps taken by voters to reverse the gains of public employees in other California cities see, "Solving Employee Relations Problems by Charter Amendments: A New Legal Quandry?," M. Taylor, California Public Employee Relations, September 1976.

18. The average earnings of city craft workers exceeded the average earnings of private sector craft workers who earned the same hourly wage, but typically worked less than a full week, especially in the face of the recession which plagued the nation at this time.

19. The weakness of the public sector strike as an offensive weapon for municipal employees in San Francisco confirms the views of Burton and Krider, op. cit., and R. Horton, "Arbitration, Arbitrators and the Public Interest", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, July 1975, who question the strength of the public sector strike weapon, in general.

20. See H. Katz, "The Municipal Budgetary Response to Changing Labor Costs: The Case of San Francisco", Sloan School working paper 965-78, MIT, January 1978.

21. For seminal discussions of multilateral bargaining see, K. McLennon and M. Moskow, "Multilateral Bargaining in the Public Sector", in Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Winter Meeting, (Industrial Relations Research Association, Madison, 1969), and T. Kochan, "A Theory of Multilateral Collective Bargaining in City Governments", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, July 1974.

BASEMENT

Date Due

MAY 30 1990

DEC 7 1984

DEC 16 1985

DEC 31 1985

OCT 9 1986

FEB 03 1987

APR 24 1990

Lib-26-67

HD28.M414 no.963- 77
Rhoades, Richa/A correlation of R&D la
734829 D*BKS 00054865
3 9080 001 068 433

HD28.M414 no.964- 77
Lorange, Peter/An analytical scheme fo
745177 D*BKS 00142876
3 9080 002 124 003

HD28.M414 no.966- 78
Reinhard, Nico/Missing values in a rel
745179 D*BKS 00142218
3 9080 002 112 982

HD28.M414 no.971- 78
Katz, Harry Ch/Municipal labor relatio
735250 D*BKS 00057500
3 9080 001 100 525

HD28.M414 no.973- 78
Lilien, Gary L/The diffusion of photov
735249 D*BKS 00057501
3 9080 001 100 541

HD28.M414 no.974- 78
Lilien, Gary L/ADVISOR 1 :
745181 D*BKS 00142877
3 9080 002 124 029